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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic 
dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one 
justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. 
That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in 
believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources 
provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s 
evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with regards to P, 
then one is not justified in having any attitude towards P. Otherwise put, 
no attitude towards the doubted proposition respects one’s higher-order 
doubt. I argue that the most promising response to this problem is to hold 
that when one has a higher-order doubt about P, the best one can do to 
respect such a doubt is to simply have no attitude towards P. Higher-
order doubt is thus much more rationally corrosive than non-higher-order 
doubt as it undermines the possibility of justifiably having any attitude 
towards the doubted proposition. 
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The Problem of Respecting Higher-Order Doubt 
 
One has higher-order justification with regards to a proposition P if one 
has justification for believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in the 
claim that one is justified in believing P. In recent papers, Richard 
Feldman has argued that whether one is justified in believing a 
proposition can be affected by one’s higher-order justification. Specifically, 
he has argued that if one is either justified in disbelieving or withholding 
belief as to whether one is justified in believing P, then one is not justified 
in believing P.1 Feldman describes someone who is responsive to his 
higher-order justification as “respecting the evidence,” (2005, 95-6). For 
example, if Sherlock Holmes’s evidence indicates that he is not justified in 
believing that Moriarty is guilty, then Holmes must respect that evidence 
by not believing in his guilt. 
 In this paper I consider the implications of Feldman’s position with 
regards to how one should respect higher-order doubt. Higher-order doubt 
consists of one’s justifiably withholding belief as to what attitude towards 
a proposition is justified. By way of illustration, suppose that a student in 
an epistemology class considers two propositions: 
(1) I am not a brain in vat.  
(2) I am justified in believing that I am not a brain in a vat. 
The student might withhold belief with respect to the truth of (1) without 
having any doubts as to its justificatory status. Indeed, one possible 
                                                
1 Feldman (2005, 108-110), (2006, 231-233), and (2009, 306-308). 
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reason for withholding belief in (1) is that one lacks justification on its 
behalf. In contrast, withholding belief about (2) is a kind of doubt about 
the justificatory status of (1). Having been exposed to skeptical 
arguments, the student might not know what attitude he is justified in 
taking towards (1) – either belief, withholding belief, or somewhat less 
likely, disbelief. These two kinds of doubt need to be distinguished. 
Justifiably withholding belief as to the justificatory status of propositions 
I refer to as “higher-order” doubt. 
How should one respect higher-order doubt? That is, if one is justified 
in withholding belief as to what attitude towards P is justified, what 
attitude should one take towards P? In this paper, I argue that if one has 
a higher-order doubt with respect to P, then no attitude towards P is 
justified. One should neither believe, disbelieve, nor even withhold belief 
as to the truth of P. This is a startling result. If correct, a higher-order 
doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. No matter what attitude one takes 
towards P, it is unjustified. In this way, higher-order doubt is more 
rationally destructive than non-higher-order doubt. For while one can 
always respect grounds for non-higher-order doubt by withholding belief, 
no attitude is consistent with respecting a higher-order doubt. In this 
way, higher-order doubt is particularly toxic2 – if one has such a doubt, it 
seems that there is no rational way to respond to it.3  
                                                
2 I am borrowing this term from Christensen (2010). He argues that in some 
cases, higher-order evidence can be rationally toxic in that respecting it compels 
one to “fall short of some rational ideal,” (2010, 210).  
3 Turri (2012) argues for a similar position. Turri provides a case where one has 
reason to believe that withholding belief in P is not justified, but where there is 
no reason to consider either believing or disbelieving P justified. This produces an 
epistemic dilemma. Turri presents this as a puzzle about withholding – what 
attitude should one take when all one has to go on is that withholding is not 
justified? However, I suggest this is but one instance of the problem of higher-
order doubt, which can arise in other ways. For example, the epistemology 
student may have reason to think that he should not disbelieve that he is not a 
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This paper has three sections. In section 1, I offer examples to clarify 
the notion of higher-order doubt. In section 2, I argue that when one has 
a higher-order doubt about a proposition, no attitude towards it is 
justified. In section 3, I consider responses to the problem. I argue that 
the most promising is to hold that when one has a higher-order doubt 
about P, the best one can do is to have no attitude towards P. Because a 
higher-order doubt renders any attitude unjustified, one must simply 
abandon having any attitude towards the proposition. 
 
1. Higher-Order Doubt 
We can doubt many things. One thing we can doubt is what attitude 
towards a proposition is justified. Such doubt I refer to as “higher-order.” 
For example, a higher-order doubt as to the existence of God would not 
be a doubt about whether God exists, but rather about what attitude one 
is justified in taking towards God’s existence. In this section, I introduce 
two examples to clarify this kind of doubt. 
 Suppose that a conscientious juror is assessing the evidence presented 
in a murder trial. Everyone on the jury agrees that the evidence does not 
show that the defendant is innocent. However, there is disagreement as to 
whether the evidence justifies believing or withholding belief in his guilt. 
Strong arguments have been provided on both sides, and upon reflection, 
the juror is at a loss. It seems to him that each side makes a compelling 
argument as to whether the evidence justifies believing or withholding 
belief in the guilt of the defendant, and he finds it difficult to determine 
which argument comes out on top. For this reason, the juror justifiably 
withholds belief in the following: 
 (J1) I am justified in believing that the defendant is guilty. 
                                                                                                                     
brain in vat, but he might doubt whether he should believe or withhold belief. 
Both cases raise the problem of what attitude one should take towards a 
proposition when one has reason to not consider any of the attitudes justified.  
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The juror’s justifiably withholding belief in (J1) is an example of higher-
order doubt. 
 Later we will consider reasons for denying that higher-order doubt is 
possible. But upon first consideration, this is very implausible.  You don’t 
have to be a philosopher to recognize that you can be mistaken about 
whether you are justified in believing a claim. And in some cases like that 
of the juror’s, one might have good reason to suspend judgment as to 
whether belief is justified. If there are any claims that it is not possible for 
someone to justifiably withhold belief in, they are few in number. And it 
is not plausible that all claims about what we are justified in believing 
belong to this privileged class. If that were the case, there would not be so 
many interesting disputes in epistemology. 
 Although you need not be a philosopher to have a higher-order 
doubt, it sure helps. For philosophers who spend their time puzzling over 
the nature of epistemic justification, higher-order doubt is an occupational 
hazard. The reason is simple. Doubt about the conditions of justified 
belief can lead to doubt about whether one is justified in believing a 
particular proposition. To illustrate, let us consider an example of 
someone who has doubts about how to resolve a recent debate in 
epistemology. 
 The debate over peer disagreement concerns how we should respond 
to a peer’s disagreeing with us about some matter.4 In this debate, your 
peer is someone who is equally informed as you, and who has comparable 
cognitive abilities with regards to a certain subject matter.5 How should 
one respond to perceived peer disagreement? Consider an example. 
Suppose that based on a careful assessment of the philosophical 
considerations both for and against, you have come to accept the 
compatibilist position in the free-will debate. However, you discover that 
                                                
4 For a helpful introduction to this debate, see Feldman and Warfield (2010). 
5 See Feldman (2007, 201). 
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one of your peers disagrees and thinks that those very considerations 
instead support incompatibilism. How should you respond to that 
disagreement? On strong conciliatory views, you should “split the 
difference” and suspend judgment about whether compatibilism is correct. 
On weak conciliatory views, you should lower your confidence in the truth 
of compatibilism, although this may not require the suspension of 
judgment. On non-conciliatory views, you should ignore the disagreement 
and maintain your attitude towards compatibilism.6 
 Since this debate concerns the necessary conditions of justified belief, 
doubt as to its resolution can generate doubt as to whether your beliefs 
are justified. Suppose that you are aware of your peer’s disagreement 
regarding compatibilism, but that you are undecided about which view 
concerning the proper response to disagreement is correct. This is no far-
fetched possibility. You might be aware of the debate, but not well 
enough informed to take a side. Or you might have plunged into the 
debate, only to come up skeptical. Either way, you should withhold belief 
in the following: 
 (D1) I am justified in believing that compatibilism is correct. 
If the strong conciliatory position is correct, then (D1) is false. But if the 
non-conciliatory position is correct then it may very well be true. Being 
undecided about which position is correct, you ought to be undecided as 
to the truth of (D1). You ought to have a higher-order doubt. 
 Before turning to the question of how one ought to respond to such 
doubts, three points of clarification will prove useful. First, it is important 
to be clear as to content of a higher-order doubt. Recall that the juror’s 
higher-order doubt consists of his withholding belief as to the truth of: 
 (J1) I am justified in believing that the defendant is guilty. 
                                                
6 I have borrowed this taxonomy from Matheson (2009, 269-70). 
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What makes this doubt higher-order is that it concerns what he is 
justified in believing. In contrast, withholding belief in the following 
would not be a higher-order doubt: 
 (J2) The defendant is guilty. 
It is because the juror withholds belief as to (J1) rather than (J2) that his 
doubt is higher-order. And yet it is natural to say that his doubt is in 
some sense about (J2). After all, his doubt is about the epistemic status of 
(J2). We might accommodate this by saying that while the juror’s doubt 
consists of withholding belief as to the truth of (J1), (J2) is the indirect 
object of that doubt. Since it simplifies matters, I permit myself the 
convenience of using “a higher-order doubt about (J1)” as shorthand for 
“justifiably withholding belief about what attitude towards (J1) is 
justified.” 
 Second, note that one can have a higher-order doubt about P despite 
being confident of one of the attitudes towards P that it is not justified. 
Our juror has doubts about whether he is justified in believing or 
withholding belief in (J2). And yet he is confident that he is not justified 
in disbelieving (J2). That is, while he is confident that he has no good 
reason to believe that the accused is innocent, he is doubtful as to 
whether he should believe or withhold belief as to whether the accused is 
guilty. As I use the expression, a higher-order doubt involves justifiably 
withholding belief as to what attitude is justified. That is compatible with 
justifiably believing of one of the possible attitudes that it is unjustified. 
 Finally, my focus will be on all things considered, or ultima facie 
justified higher-order doubt. The reason for this is that if one’s doubt is 
not ultima facie justified, then it is not clear whether one ought to respect 
that doubt. For example, suppose that the juror’s doubt about whether he 
is justified in believing in the guilt of the accused is completely 
unjustified. Perhaps the juror is a racist, and refuses to give sufficient 
credibility to an African American witness who has provided good reason 
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to believe in the guilt of the accused. If so, must he take into 
consideration his doubt when assessing the guilt of the accused? This is a 
difficult question. On the one hand, it is odd to suggest that he should be 
responsive to an unjustified doubt based on an irrational prejudice. On 
the other hand, it would seem that if he really has such a doubt, he would 
be irrational to not take it seriously. I will not attempt to decide this 
issue here. Instead, I will simply focus on examples of ultima facie 
justified higher-order doubt as the clearest examples of doubt that deserve 
our respect. 
 
2. Respecting Higher-Order Doubt 
 The thesis of this paper is that when one has a higher-order about P, 
one is not justified in having any attitude towards P. To have such a 
doubt is to justifiably refuse to endorse any attitude towards P. And 
although one is not required to endorse every attitude that one has – that 
would yield a vicious regress – one should not have an attitude that one 
ought not endorse. If so, when one has a higher-order doubt about P, one 
should not take any attitude towards P. 
 To defend this position, I will extend the work of Feldman, who has 
argued that we must respect the evidence, which he explains as follows: 
I will say that the person is respecting the evidence about E and P 
when the person’s belief concerning P corresponds to what is 
indicated by the person’s evidence about E’s support for P. That is, a 
person respects the evidence about E and P by believing P when his 
or her evidence indicates that this evidence supports P or by not 
believing P when the evidence indicates that this evidence does not 
support P. (2005, 95-6) 
For example, if our juror concluded that the evidence did not support the 
guilt of the defendant, he should not so believe. Feldman supports this by 
noting the oddness of claims like: 
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(3) The defendant is guilty, but the evidence does not support his 
guilt. 
(4) The defendant is guilty, but I withhold belief as to whether the 
evidence supports his guilt.7 
These claims express incoherent attitudes. The juror should not believe 
that the defendant is guilty while denying or withholding belief as to 
whether the evidence supports this position. 
 For Feldman, respecting the evidence involves respecting one’s 
justification.  Consider another odd pair of claims: 
(5) The defendant is guilty, but I am not justified in believing that he 
is guilty. 
(6) The defendant is guilty, but I withhold belief as to whether I am 
justified in believing that he is guilty. 
These claims also express incoherent attitudes. The juror should not 
believe that the defendant is guilty while denying or withholding belief as 
to whether that attitude is justified. For evidentialists like Feldman who 
hold that the justified attitude is the one that fits the evidence, these 
requirements are equivalent.8 Respecting one’s evidence involves 
respecting one’s justification. Thus we can formulate this requirement as: 
RJ. One justifiably believes P only if one neither justifiably 
disbelieves nor justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is 
justified in believing P. 
As Feldman notes, this requirement can be explained in terms of the 
notion of defeat.9  One’s justification for believing is undefeated only if 
                                                
7 Feldman (2005, 108), (2006, 232), and (2009, 307-8). 
8 Indeed, Feldman (2005, 101) endorses a version of the requirement that we 
respect our higher-order justification. 
9 Feldman (2005, 103-4) and (2009, 308). 
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one does not justifiably disbelieve nor withhold belief as to whether one is 
justified in believing. 
 RJ applies to one kind of attitude: belief. But what of the other 
attitudes – disbelief and withheld belief? Are they subject to analogous 
requirements? I contend that they are, and that we should extend 
Feldman’s position to cover all three. That is, we should accept the 
generalization: 
RJG. One’s attitude A towards proposition P is justified only if one 
neither justifiably disbelieves nor justifiably withholds belief as to 
whether one is justified in having attitude A towards P. 
In general, it is plausible that belief and disbelief are subject to the same 
requirements. This would be trivial if disbelief in P is simply the belief 
that P is false. But even without making that assumption, the analogous 
requirement is supported by another pair of odd claims: 
(7) I disbelieve that the defendant is guilty, but I am not justified in 
disbelieving that he is guilty. 
(8) I disbelieve that the defendant is guilty, but I withhold belief as to 
whether I am justified in disbelieving that he is guilty. 
Like (5) and (6), (7) and (8) express incoherent attitudes. The 
explanation of the incoherence is the same. Just as one should not believe 
while not considering that attitude justified, nor should one disbelieve 
while not considering that attitude justified. 
RJG also entails that one should not withhold belief while refusing to 
consider that attitude justified. Certainly one should not withhold belief if 
one considers that attitude unjustified. For example, the following is 
incoherent: 
(9) I withhold belief as to whether the defendant is guilty, but I am 
not justified in withholding belief as to whether he is guilty. 
Suppose the juror concluded that the evidence clearly shows that the 
defendant is guilty, and that he is not justified in withholding belief. 
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Clearly in that case he would not be justified in withholding belief. But 
might it be reasonable for him to withhold belief if he is justified in 
withholding belief as to whether that attitude is justified? Consider the 
following: 
(10) I withhold belief as to whether the defendant is guilty, but I 
withhold belief as to whether I am justified in withholding belief as to 
whether he is guilty. 
We have seen that analogues of (10) suggest that one should not believe 
or disbelieve a proposition if one refuses to consider such attitudes 
justified. It is hard to see why the combination of attitudes expressed by 
(10) is any more coherent. To refuse to consider an attitude justified upon 
reflection is to deny it one’s endorsement. If that denial is justified, then 
one has good reason to not have that attitude. (10) expresses a denial of 
endorsement of withholding belief. If such a denial is justified, then one 
should not continue withholding belief. Thus (10) does not appear to be 
any more coherent than (6) or (8). 
Since the incoherence of withholding belief in the face of higher-order 
doubt is crucial to what follows, another supporting example is called for. 
Suppose that Alfred and Simon have scrutinized the considerations on 
behalf of external world skepticism. As a result, both have concluded they 
cannot decide what attitude they should take towards claims like “I have 
hands,” (H). They are confident they should not disbelieve (H). But 
should they follow the skeptic and withhold belief in (H)? Or should they 
follow the anti-skeptic and believe (H)? As to this matter, they cannot 
decide. And yet despite their shared higher-order doubt, they adopt very 
different attitudes towards (H). Simon sides with the skeptic and 
withholds belief, whereas Alfred sides with the anti-skeptic and believes 
(H). 
Feldman has given us reason to consider Alfred’s position incoherent. 
Simon might explain this to Alfred as follows: 
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Alfred, your position is unreasonable. On the basis of careful 
reflection, you withhold belief as to whether it is reasonable for you to 
believe (H). So far as you can tell, there’s no better reason to be an 
anti-skeptic and believe (H) rather than to be a skeptic and withhold 
belief in (H). And yet you continue to cling to your pre-philosophical 
belief in (H). By your own lights, you must admit that this is clearly 
unreasonable. 
Simon’s criticism seems right. Given his higher-order doubt, Alfred should 
not believe (H). However, Alfred can use the very same reasoning against 
Simon: 
Your response is no more reasonable, Simon. We both doubt whether 
we should believe or withhold belief in (H). You argue that given 
these doubts, my anti-skeptical position about (H) is unreasonable. 
But how is your skepticism any more reasonable? Granted, as far as I 
can tell, the reasons do not favor my position. But you grant that as 
far as you can tell, nor do they favor yours. Given this parity, how 
can your attitude be any more reasonable than my own? 
Alfred’s response seems right. If Alfred should not believe while refusing 
to consider his attitude justified, then nor should Simon withhold belief 
while refusing to consider his own attitude justified. If so, those who hold 
that belief must respect higher-order doubt should also hold that so too 
must withheld belief. Otherwise one must hold that while Simon can 
disregard his higher-order doubt, Alfred cannot.  
Thus far I have argued that Feldman’s considerations on behalf of RJ 
also support RJG. But RJG generates the problem of how to respect 
higher-order doubt. Indeed, the case of Alfred and Simon clearly 
illustrates this problem. Given their higher-order doubt, what attitude 
towards (H) are they justified in having? If RJG is correct, then they are 
not justified in having any attitude towards that proposition. For 
according to that principle, one should not take an attitude that one is 
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justified in not considering justified. Since Alfred and Simon are justified 
in not considering any of the attitudes towards (H) justified, they cannot 
coherently have any attitude towards that proposition. 
This is a disquieting result. Can one’s standing with respect to a 
proposition be so bad that even withholding belief is not an option? Non-
higher-order doubt does not have this corrosive power. If one has grounds 
for doubting whether a proposition is true or false, one may always 
withhold belief. But if RJG is correct, higher-order doubt leaves one with 
no possibility of having a justified attitude towards the proposition at all. 
This consequence of RJG should therefore give us pause. 
 
3. Responses 
 In this section, I consider three different responses to the problem. 
The first appeals to versions of internalism in order to argue that it is 
never reasonable to withhold belief about what attitude towards a 
proposition is justified – making higher-order doubt impossible. The 
second appeals to the idea that withholding belief is justified by default in 
order to argue that it is not possible for one to lack justification for some 
attitude towards a proposition – making epistemic dilemmas impossible. I 
argue that these responses fail and defend a third. I suggest that while 
higher-order doubt does render any attitude unjustified, one can always 
retreat to having no attitude towards the proposition. 
 
3.1 Internalism 
 On an internalist account of justification, higher-order doubt may 
seem impossible. According to internalism, what justifies an attitude must 
be accessible, or internal to one’s perspective in the way that pain is. Pain 
is an occurrent mental state, and while one need not attend to a pain, it 
is easy to become aware of the pain just by reflection. Because it is 
accessible in this way, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance in which 
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one could reasonably doubt whether one is in pain. According to 
internalism, the factors that determine what attitude towards a 
proposition are justified – or justifiers – are within one’s perspective in 
the way that pain is. On that view, doubts about justification may seem 
no more reasonable than doubts about whether one is in pain. After all, if 
the justifiers are accessible to one and not hidden from view, then to 
suspend judgment about whether a particular belief is justified would be 
to fail to adequately respond to the available evidence. In this way 
internalism may seem to preclude the possibility of higher-order doubt.10 
 However, even if the justifiers of an attitude are necessarily 
accessible, it does not follow that so too is the attitude's justificatory 
status. If so, internalism does not preclude higher-order doubt. Suppose 
that Holmes and Watson are aware of the very same crime scene 
evidence, and yet only Holmes is in a position to recognize its implication 
of Moriarty. In that case, Watson possesses evidence affording him 
justification on behalf of Moriarty’s involvement without having access to 
its epistemic import. He has access to the justifiers, but not to the fact 
that they justify belief. Thus even if we grant that one necessarily has 
access to the justifiers of an attitude, it does not follow that higher-order 
doubt is impossible. 
 To illustrate this point, consider a particular version of internalism: 
Conee and Feldman’s evidentialism. The heart of this internalist position 
is the following principle: 
                                                
10 For a clear statement of this kind of internalism, see Smithies (2011). Smithies 
argues that justification is accessible in that one has justification for believing P 
if and only if one has justification for believing that one has justification for 
believing P. 
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EJ. Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically 
justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence 
S has at t. (1985, 83)  
EJ is internalist in that it restricts justifiers to the available evidence. 
Anything not reflected in one's evidence cannot bear on justification. But 
the fact that what justifies – one’s evidence – is accessible does mean that 
one cannot have doubts about what attitude fits that evidence. Consider 
again our juror. It may very well be the case that the juror’s evidence 
supports the guilt of the defendant even though he cannot appreciate that 
fact. In that case EJ implies that belief is justified, even though the juror 
cannot recognize it. Evidentialism allows for higher-order doubt. 
 A stronger form of internalism, however, may preclude higher-order 
doubt. This is inferential internalism, which can be formulated as: 
II. One is justified in believing P on the basis of evidence E only if 
one is justified in believing that E supports P.11 
Evidentialism and inferential internalism impose different necessary 
conditions on justified belief. According to evidentialism, justified belief 
requires supporting evidence. According to inferential internalism, it 
requires justification for believing that one has supporting evidence. How 
might inferential internalism preclude the possibility of higher-order 
doubt? Consider how the juror ought to reason according to the 
inferential internalist: 
A. I cannot determine whether the evidence supports the defendant’s 
guilt. 
                                                
11 “Inferential Internalism” is Richard Fumerton’s label for someone who accepts 
his Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ): “To be justified in believing P on 
the basis of E one must have not only (1) justification for believing E, but also 
(2) justification for believing that E makes probable P,” (Fumerton 2006, 39). II 
is simply the second condition of PIJ. 
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B. So, I am not justified in believing that the evidence supports the 
defendant’s guilt. 
C. So, I am not justified in believing in the defendant’s guilt. 
The step from A to B is unproblematic. The juror is at a loss about what 
the evidence indicates, and ought to consider himself unjustified in 
believing that it implicates the defendant. The step from B to C is 
mandated by inferential internalism. According to this form of 
internalism, the juror is justified in believing in the guilt of the defendant 
only if he is justified in believing that his evidence supports that verdict. 
But as we have seen, he is not justified in believing this claim about his 
evidence. Finally, note that if the juror ought to reason in this way then 
he should not have a higher-order doubt. For C is the claim that belief in 
the defendant’s guilt is not justified. In this way, inferential internalism 
suggests that the juror should have no doubt about whether belief is 
justified. 
 This strategy generalizes. Plausibly, any case where one might seem 
to have grounds for higher-order doubt is a case where one has doubts 
about what the evidence indicates. But if you have doubts about the 
evidence, then you should have no doubt that belief is not justified. 
 Does inferential internalism solve the problem of how to respect 
higher-order doubt? It suggests that anyone who accepts inferential 
internalism should not have such doubts. Unfortunately, that does not 
show that higher-order doubt is impossible, nor does it explain how to 
respect such doubt should it occur. This is because those who do not 
accept inferential internalism can still have higher-order doubts. Suppose 
that instead of accepting inferential internalism, the juror rejects it in 
favor of evidentialism. If so, he would hold that the attitude he is justified 
in taking towards the defendant’s guilt is the attitude supported by the 
evidence, regardless of whether he can appreciate that support. From his 
position, the evidence may provide him with justification for belief even if 
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he cannot recognize it, and thus he would reject the inferential 
internalist’s move from B to C. Yes, he cannot tell whether his evidence 
supports belief. But no, that does not mean that belief is unjustified. 
Given his evidentialism, the fact that he cannot tell what the evidence 
supports simply means that he cannot tell what attitude is justified. He 
ought to have a higher-order doubt.12 
 Additionally, those who rationally withhold belief as to whether 
inferential internalism is correct can have higher-order doubts. Suppose 
the juror is agnostic in this way. He should then be equally doubtful 
about the step from B to C. Being undecided about inferential 
internalism, he should doubt whether his having justification on behalf of 
the defendant's guilt depends upon his having justification for believing 
the higher-order claim that his evidence supports that verdict. If 
inferential internalism is correct, then there is such a dependence and 
belief is not justified. But if inferential internalism is not correct, then 
there is no such dependence, and belief might very well be justified. Given 
that he cannot tell whether inferential internalism is correct, so too he 
cannot tell whether belief is justified. He ought to have a higher-order 
doubt. 
 Far from showing it impossible, the inferential internalist response 
thus suggests a recipe for the production of higher-order doubt. Many 
debates in epistemology concern the necessary conditions of justified 
                                                
12 This is something of an oversimplification. In Alexander (2012) I have argued 
that while we should reject inferential internalism, we should accept a form of 
externalism that has some of the consequences of internalism. If the juror 
accepted this hybrid position, then his doubts about his evidence would defeat 
whatever justification they provide. But just as the juror may reject inferential 
internalism, so too he may reject my proposed hybrid position. For such an 
individual, higher-order doubt remains a possibility. 
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belief. Must one be justified in believing that one’s evidence supports 
one’s belief? Must one lack peers who disagree? Doubt about these 
proposed necessary conditions can generate higher-order doubt. For if you 
recognize that whether or not a belief of yours is justified depends upon a 
proposed necessary condition of justification, and you have doubts about 
the correctness of that condition, then so too you ought to doubt whether 
your belief is justified. 
 
3.2 The Default Response 
  It is natural to think that the default attitude towards a proposition 
is withheld belief. In the absence of justification for either believing or 
disbelieving, one is justified in withholding. If so, epistemic dilemmas may 
seem impossible. By lacking justification for either belief or disbelief, one 
would automatically have justification for withholding. And so it would 
seem impossible for one to lack justification for any attitude if 
withholding is justified by default. Call this the “default” response.13 
 How should we understand the claim that withholding is justified by 
default? Consider an analogy. To say that keeping a promise is justified 
by default is to say that unless there is overriding reason in favor of 
breaking it, it ought to be upheld. It is not to say that you should always 
keep your promises. Only that in the absence of reason to do otherwise, 
they should be kept. Otherwise put, when one has made a promise, one 
has prima facie justification to keep it, although that justification may be 
defeated. In this light, the proposal that withholding belief is default 
justified amounts to the claim that in the absence of justification for 
either belief or disbelief one has prima facie justification for withholding. 
This is plausible. Consider our juror, but before the trial has begun. At 
                                                
13 Thanks to both Fabrizio Cariani and Andrew Jordan for suggesting versions of 
this response. 
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that point, given the absence of evidence, the juror ought to withhold 
belief as to the defendant’s guilt. 
 This suggests what I call the default thesis: 
DT. If S lacks prima facie justification for believing P, and S lacks 
prima facie justification for disbelieving P, then S has prima facie 
justification for withholding belief with respect to P. 
So understood, the idea that withholding belief is default justified is quite 
plausible. However, it is perfectly compatible with the thesis that higher-
order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. For while the default thesis 
concerns the conditions under which withholding belief is prima facie 
justified, my thesis concerns the conditions under which that justification 
is defeated. One can consistently hold that while withholding belief is 
default justified, such justification can be defeated by a higher-order 
doubt. Consider the case of the juror. It is perfectly consistent to hold 
that at the beginning of the trial he is default justified in withholding 
belief as to whether the defendant is guilty, but that in the course of the 
trial he acquires a higher-order doubt that renders any attitude towards 
the defendant’s guilt unjustified. According to DT, if the juror lacks 
prima facie justification for belief or disbelief, then he possesses prima 
facie justification for withholding. But that says nothing about how such 
justification can be defeated. The default thesis about the conditions 
under which withholding belief is prima facie justified is thus compatible 
with my thesis about when that justification is defeated.14 
 The default thesis therefore does not entail that there are no 
epistemic dilemmas. The analogy with promise keeping illustrates this. 
That keeping one’s promise is default justified does not imply that one 
could never face a moral dilemma about keeping a promise. Even if the 
                                                
14 I raise additional concerns with the default thesis in Alexander (2012, 513-515). 
I will not revisit them here, as I think that in this context the more pressing 
concern is that the thesis does not preclude higher-order doubt. 
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default is to keep one’s promises, there could be a circumstance where 
both keeping and breaking one’s promise are, all things considered, wrong. 
So too with the case of withholding belief. Even if the default is to 
withhold belief, there could be a circumstance in which all things 
considered no attitude towards a proposition is ultima facie justified.  
 In response, one might propose the following stronger principle: 
ND. If S lacks ultima facie justification for believing P, and S lacks 
ultima facie justification for disbelieving P, then S has ultima facie 
justification for withholding belief with respect to P. 
ND may look like a mere variant of the default thesis. After all, ND is 
saying the same thing about ultima facie justification that DT says about 
prima facie justification. But the apparent similarity is misleading. For 
ND is equivalent to: 
ND*. S has ultima facie justification for either believing P, 
disbelieving P, or withholding belief in P. 
And ND* is simply a denial that epistemic dilemmas are possible – the 
claim I have argued against in this paper. This makes the appeal to either 
ND or ND* simply question begging. As we have seen, these principles do 
not follow from the thesis that withholding belief is default justified. Thus 
to appeal to them would be to simply assert that epistemic dilemmas are 
not possible, without offering any explanation as to why. 
  The suggestion that withholding is default justified therefore provides 
no solution to the problem of how to respect higher-order doubt. The 
default thesis is perfectly compatible with the claim that a higher-order 
doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. In contrast, while ND does 
preclude such dilemmas, it is not supported by the default thesis and it 
simply begs the question against the position defended in this paper. 
 
3.3. The No Attitude Response 
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 I have argued that a higher-order doubt about P renders any attitude 
towards P unjustified. In this section, I propose an understanding of this 
result that makes it less counter-intuitive. According to this proposal, the 
only way to respect a higher-order doubt is to have no attitude towards 
the proposition. If a higher-order doubt renders any attitude unjustified, 
then we must simply avoid having any attitude. Call this the “no 
attitude” response. 
 This response is possible because there is a difference between 
withholding belief and having no attitude. For example, there is a 
difference between your withholding belief as to whether God exists, and 
a terrier’s having no position regarding the matter. The difference is that 
withheld belief is an attitude towards a proposition. This distinction is 
important. After all, the propositions to which one has any attitude 
towards are but a small sample of the population. There are countless 
propositions that we have not considered, as well as propositions that 
outstrip our powers of comprehension. For this reason we must 
distinguish the propositions to which we have some attitude from those to 
which we have none.15 
 Still, one might grant the distinction between withholding belief and 
having no attitude while doubting what the no attitude response requires: 
namely, that one can respect a higher-order doubt about P by having no 
attitude towards P at all. That sounds like the impossible: having a doubt 
about P while having no attitude towards P. But this semblance of 
impossibility disappears when we recall that a higher-order doubt is not 
an attitude towards P but to the higher-order claim that belief in P is 
                                                
15 Beyond the fact that it involves an attitude towards a proposition, what is the 
nature of withheld belief? Like the complementary question about the nature of 
belief, this is a substantive question in its own right that I will not attempt to 
address here. For further defense of the claim that withholding belief is an 
attitude towards a proposition, see Friedman (2013). 
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justified. Recall that in the case of the juror we distinguished two 
propositions: 
 (J1) I am justified in believing that the accused is guilty. 
 (J2) The accused is guilty. 
The juror’s higher-order doubt consists of his justifiably withholding belief 
in (J1). According to the no attitude response, the only way to respect 
that doubt is for the juror to have no attitude towards the lower-order 
proposition, (J2). So understood, the response does not require the juror 
to both have and not have an attitude towards the same proposition. 
 John Turri has aptly described one’s coming to not have an attitude 
towards a proposition under consideration “withdrawing” (2012, 361). 
Why think that when one has a higher-order doubt, one can respect that 
doubt by withdrawing and having no attitude? Mark Nelson (2010) has 
provided the basis of an answer to this question by arguing that there are 
no positive epistemic duties. Whereas a negative epistemic duty merely 
enjoins one to not believe when one lacks sufficient justification, a positive 
epistemic duty would require belief insofar as one possesses such 
justification.16 Nelson makes a strong case that a positive epistemic duty 
would be unreasonably demanding.17 At any given time, perception 
provides reason to believe countless propositions. For example, 
observation of a city street provides justification for an overwhelming 
variety of claims. It provides justification for claims about the appearance 
and behavior of the pedestrians passing by, claims about the flow of the 
traffic and the interaction between the vehicles, claims about the 
surrounding buildings – the list is endless. Given this “infinite 
justificational fecundity” of our evidence (2010, 96), a positive epistemic 
duty would be impossible to satisfy. Much more plausible is that our 
                                                
16 “There are things that we ought not to believe, but there is nothing that we 
ought to believe, on purely epistemic grounds,” (2010, 83). 
17 See in particular Nelson (2010), pp. 86, 87-88, and 96-98. 
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epistemic duties are merely negative. Rather than prescribe belief, they 
merely restrict the scope of permissible belief. 
 These considerations support the permissibility of not only the 
absence of belief, but also the absence of any attitude. For if it is overly 
demanding to require belief when justified, then the same can be said 
about a requirement to withhold belief. Observation of a city street may 
settle some questions, but it leaves even more undecided. Are you obliged 
to withhold belief whether that pedestrian waiting for the light to change 
prefers chocolate to vanilla ice cream? Must you have any attitude as to 
whether the number of people in the building across the street is odd or 
even? Surely not. You possess justification for withholding belief, and so 
that attitude is epistemically permissible in each case. But it is not 
obligatory. You do not violate any epistemic duty if you simply have no 
position regarding these matters and prefer to concern yourself with other 
things. There is no positive epistemic duty to either believe or withhold 
belief. It is always epistemically permissible for one to have no attitude.18 
 The absence of positive epistemic duties thus provides a solution to 
the problem of higher-order doubt. If it is always epistemically permissible 
to have no attitude, then a reasonable response to a higher-order doubt is 
to withdraw from the proposition. By doing so, one avoids violating any 
epistemic duty. That said, it is important to note the modesty of this 
solution. Unlike the previous responses, the no attitude response concedes 
                                                
18 Nelson equates the absence of belief and withheld belief, and thus fails to 
distinguish withholding belief from having no attitude towards a proposition. 
This is unfortunate. For if you do not make this distinction, then the thesis that 
belief is never epistemically obliged will seem to entail the thesis that withholding 
is always epistemically permitted. Thus, Nelson must respond to the charge that 
it is counter-intuitive to hold that it is permissible for one to withhold belief 
regarding P when one is justified in believing P (2010, 93-94). If instead we 
recognize, as I have urged, that withholding belief is not the same as having no 
attitude then we face no such problem. 
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not only that higher-order doubt is possible, but also that when one has 
such a doubt, no attitude towards the proposition is justified. And while 
the no attitude response shows us how to live with this result, it does not 
make it any less surprising. 
 Does the no attitude response show that higher-order doubt does not 
generate an epistemic dilemma, as I have claimed? After all, it shows that 
when one has such a doubt, one can avoid violating one’s epistemic duties 
by withdrawing. However, this does not mean that there is no epistemic 
dilemma. Consider an analogy. A chess player might discover that 
whatever he does, his next move will put him in checkmate. Within the 
game of chess he faces a dilemma, and it would be a mistake to say that 
there is no dilemma since he can always withdraw from the game. So too 
with an epistemic dilemma. Within inquiry one faces an epistemic 
dilemma insofar as no attitude towards a proposition is justified, and it 
would be a mistake to say that there is no dilemma since one could 
always withdraw from the proposition. 
 Regardless of whether it is classified as an epistemic dilemma or not, 
the important point is that the result of a higher-order doubt is a 
dramatic failure of inquiry. Less exotic failures are commonplace. 
Irresponsible inquiry can fall short by producing an unjustified attitude. 
And responsible inquiry can produce justified attitudes that fall short of 
the truth – as in the case of not only justified false beliefs, but also every 
instance of justified withheld belief. But in comparison, higher-order 
doubt represents a more dramatic failure. For when one has a higher-
order doubt about P, one is not justified in having any attitude towards P 
– not even withheld belief. Thus while the no attitude response does show 
that there is something that we can do in response to a higher-order 
doubt, it does not deny that such doubt represents a distinctive problem 
for inquiry. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper I have defended the thesis that if one has a higher-order 
doubt about P, no attitude towards P is justified. I have considered three 
responses to the problem, and have argued that the no attitude response 
is the most promising. According to that response, if one has a higher-
order doubt the best one can do is to withdraw from the proposition – to 
simply have no attitude. This response concedes that higher-order doubt 
is possible, and that when one has such a doubt, no attitude towards the 
proposition in question is justified. The solution is therefore a modest one. 
Granted, when one has a higher-order doubt, there is an epistemically 
permitted response – withdrawal. Nevertheless, that does not mean that 
higher-order doubt is not a genuine problem for inquiry. On the contrary, 
the production of higher-order doubt remains a distinctive way that 
inquiry can fail.19 
 
  
                                                
19 Versions of this paper were given at the 5th annual Midwest Epistemology 
Workshop, the Northwestern University Epistemology Brown Bag Series, and the 
2011 meeting of the Iowa Philosophical Society. I would like to thank 
participants at those events for their feedback. For additional discussion I would 
like to thank Stephen Biggs, Fabrizio Cariani, Richard Fumerton, John Greco, 
Ali Hasan, Andrew Jordan, John Tsou, and John Turri. This paper was improved 
thanks to comments from two referees and feedback from the editors at 
Philosophers’ Imprint. This research was supported by a research grant from the 
Center for Excellence in the Arts and Humanities at Iowa State University. 
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